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This study conducts a comparative analysis of the monetary 
policy transmission channels and their effects in Korea and 
Japan using a sign restriction VAR model to determine whether 
a Japanese-style monetary policy can be implemented in Korea. 
Results indicate considerable differences between Korea and Japan 
in their monetary policy transmission channels. Conventional 
monetary policy transmission channels, such as the exchange rate 
channel, asset price channel, and bank lending channel, works 
relatively well in Japan. However, in Korea, the interest rate channel 
is effective but has only a short-term effect on the exchange rate, 
and the effects on asset prices and bank lending are hard to expect 
in general. Furthermore, some potential risks working through the 
housing market may hinder financial stability. Korea and Japan see 
a limited effect on production in the real sector. These results imply 
that Korea must be careful about implementing a similar monetary 
policy as Japan.
Keywords:  Monetary policy transmission channel, Unconventional 
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I. Introduction
The growth of the Korean economy has been slowing down since the 
2000s. The employment conditions are worsening, thereby increasing 
the concern over the declining dynamics of the economy. Despite the 
cyclical economic recovery, the total factor productivity slowdown and 
shrinking working-age population because of population aging will lead 
to a constant decrease of potential growth rates,1 thereby weakening 
the growth engine. Some are even worried about the “Japanification” 
of the Korean economy. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, the Japanese 
economy has maintained positive growth since the relaunch of the Abe 
administration at the end of 2012 until just before the recent COVID-19 
pandemic, while showing a remarkable drop in the unemployment rate. 
Japan has overcome the long-term economic recession, referred to 
as the “Lost Decades,” by producing positive results, such as growth 
recovery and job creation, breaking free from the chronic deflation 
(Botman et al. 2015; Posen 2020). 
Economic policies, such as fiscal and monetary policies, aside from 
the fundamental economic conditions, may affect the differing economic 
trends in Korea and Japan. The Korean economy is recently facing 
1 In August 2019, the Bank of Korea announced the estimates of Korea’s 
potential growth rates as 5.0–5.2% in 2001–2005, 4.1–4.2% in 2006–2010, 3.0–
3.4% in 2011–2015, and 2.7–2.8% in 2016–2020 (Kwon, Kim, Ji, Kim, and Noh, 
2019).
Source: Bank of Korea
Figure 1
Economic Growth ratEs in KorEa and Japan
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a continuous threat of low growth and low inflation. With a reduced 
capacity to manage policy interest rates, some argue for the need to 
expand policy space through unconventional monetary policies such as 
quantitative easing. Some suggest the need to apply an unconventional 
monetary policy in Korea similar to that of Japan given that the 
Japanese economy has been receiving positive feedback since the 
implementation of Abenomics (Lee, 2015; Yoon, 2016). Thus, this study 
comparatively analyzes the monetary policy transmission channels and 
their effects in Korea and Japan, thereby drawing policy implications on 
whether a similar type of unconventional monetary policy in Japan can 
be applied to Korea.
To review whether Japan’s unconventional monetary policy can be 
applied to Korea, analyzing the effectiveness of the monetary policies 
in the two countries is first necessary. However, related studies are 
few. Cargill (2005) qualitatively compared the inflation situation in 
Korea and Japan and pointed out that Japan faced deflation, unlike 
Korea in the early 2000s; Korea adopted inflation targeting in 1997 and 
anchored the expected inflation, but Japan did not. Braun and Shioji 
(2006) analyzed Korea, Japan, and the US using the sign restriction 
VAR model. They reported that the liquidity effect hypothesis, in which 
an accommodative monetary policy expands the money supply and 
increases industrial production and prices, was not significant in 
Japan and the US but appeared in Korea. Lee (2014) also analyzed the 
monetary policies in Korea, Japan, and the US using the sign restriction 
VAR model and discovered that, while the effectiveness of monetary 
policy is decreasing in Korea, responses are quicker and clearer in the 
Source: Bank of Korea
Figure 2
UnEmploymEnt ratEs in KorEa and Japan
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short-term interest rate and industrial production gap toward monetary 
policy shocks than in the US and Japan. Unlike the two aforementioned 
studies, Cha (2013) compared the monetary policies in Korea and 
Japan using the New Keynesian model and found that monetary policy 
in Korea is responsive to the output gap in monetary targeting regime 
and the inflationary gap in inflation targeting regime, indicating that 
the monetary policy worked effectively; however, in Japan, the variables 
had low significance and could not deem the monetary policy effective.
The present study shares common ground with Braun and Shioji 
(2006) and Lee (2014) because it comparatively analyzes the monetary 
policies in Korea and Japan using the sign restriction VAR model. 
However, while their studies used data from the 1990s to 2014 and 
examined the effects of monetary policy focusing on production, prices, 
and money supply, the present study uses the data from the mid-
2000s to 2019, including the recent implementation of Abenomics 
in Japan. This study is also distinct in that it examines various 
transmission channels, such as exchange rates, bank lending, stock 
prices, and house prices. Furthermore, since the 2000s, Korea mostly 
used conventional tools2 such as policy interest rate, whereas Japan 
depended on unconventional measures such as quantitative easing and 
yield curve control with its policy interest rate close to zero lower bound, 
which means that directly comparing the effectiveness of the monetary 
policies in the two countries was difficult. Another critical difference 
in this study compared with others is that this study uses the shadow 
policy rate3 proposed by Wu and Xia (2016) and attempts to compare 
the effectiveness of monetary policy when two countries operate 
different policy measures. 
The key findings of this study are as follows. The empirical analysis 
2 The Bank of Japan was the first in the world to implement forward 
guidance along with the zero-rate policy in February 1999 and the first to adopt 
quantitative easing to meet the reserve balance requirement in March 2001.
3 After the global financial crisis, policy interest rates in the US and Euro 
area dropped to zero, and identifying the monetary policy stance using only 
policy interest rates became difficult because central banks began to adopt 
unconventional monetary policies such as quantitative easing. The shadow 
policy rate refers to an imaginary policy interest rate to identify the stance of the 
overall monetary policies, including conventional and unconventional monetary 
policies by converting various unconventional monetary policy measures, such 
as quantitative easing to policy interest rates.
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shows that Korea has relatively greater constraints than Japan in 
terms of the effectiveness of its monetary policy. The effect of decreasing 
long-term interest rates is large, but the impact on the exchange rate 
is short-term, and the impact through the asset price channel and 
bank lending channel is hard to expect. However, if the bank lending 
channel is subdivided, the cut in policy interest rates leads to increased 
bank lending to households, thereby inducing increased stock prices 
and industrial production to a certain extent but possibly followed by 
soaring house prices. Despite the differing effectiveness, monetary policy 
in Korea and Japan shows limited success in boosting the real economy, 
contrary to the results of previous studies claiming that Korea’s 
monetary policy was more effective than that in Japan.4
This study is organized as follows. First, Section II briefly examines 
the possibility that Korea and Japan have different monetary policy 
transmission channels. Section III presents the results of the empirical 
analysis. Section IV summarizes the results and discusses the policy 
implications based on the results.
II.  Monetary policy transmission channels in Korea and 
Japan
Before empirical analysis, this section briefly discusses the possibility 
that Korea and Japan have different monetary policy transmission 
channels. In general, monetary policy is considered to affect the real 
4 Studies that individually analyzed the monetary policies in Korea and 
Japan also stated that the effect of monetary policy in Korea is weakening, and 
monetary policy in Japan severely lacks effectiveness. For example, Kim and 
Jun (2017) estimated the monetary policy effect in Korea before and after the 
global financial crisis and concluded that, after the financial crisis, the effect of 
monetary policy decreased, and reaching the maximum effect took more time to 
reach. Furthermore, Kim (2018) used the mixed innovation TVP-VAR model and 
analyzed the structural changes in the monetary policy transmission mechanism 
in 1987–2016; he found that the effect of monetary policy on production 
and inflation tended to weaken toward recent times. In Japan, Yoshino and 
Taghizadeh-Hesary (2014) used a weighted two-stage least squares analysis and 
determined that Japan’s inflation rate in Q1 2002–Q2 2014 was significantly 
influenced by high oil prices because of the weak yen rather than the GDP gap 
(economic recovery), and long-term real interest rates had no significant effect on 
aggregate demand during the same period. Thus, monetary policy did not have a 
strong impact on this trend. 
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economy and financial market through the interest rate channel, bank 
lending channel, asset price channel, and exchange rate channel.5 
Considering the following, the interest rate channel, exchange rate 
channel, and stock market channel are likely to operate more weakly 
in Korea than in Japan. The housing market channel is expected to 
operate more strongly in Korea. For the bank lending channel, bank 
lending to households is more important in Korea, whereas bank 
lending to businesses is more important in Japan.
A. Interest rate channel
First, the interest rate channel through which the adjustments in 
policy interest rates are transmitted to the short- and long-term market 
interest rates and loan and deposit interest rates operates smoothly 
in Korea (Bank of Korea 2017).6 In Korea, the short-term market 
interest rates generally decrease right after the policy interest rates 
drop to the level of the decrement or a little bit higher, and the long-
term market interest rates and bank loan and deposit interest rates 
also decrease considerably. However, the central bank’s control over 
long-term interest rates is likely to be more limited in Korea than in 
Japan because external factors have a considerable impact on the term 
premium in Korea because it is a small open economy. Previous studies, 
such as Kim and Oh (2015) and Ha and So (2017), have claimed that 
5 Many recent studies have pointed out that the unconventional monetary 
policies transmit to the financial market and real economy in quite different 
manners from those of the conventional monetary policies (e.g., signaling 
channel and portfolio channel). However, for the comparison of the monetary 
policies in Korea and Japan, this study focuses on the traditional transmission 
channels, such as interest rate channel, exchange rate channel, asset price 
channel, and bank lending channel. This study also considers that the 
various non-traditional policy measures by the Bank of Japan, including 
liquidity support for banks, negative interest rates, the purchase of long-term 
government, and corporate bonds, and the purchase of ETFs are implemented 
through the credit market, bond market, and stock market. Studying further 
how the unconventional monetary policy works through signaling channel and 
portfolio channel is worthwhile.
6 Japan implemented the zero rate policy in February 1999, changed its 
operational target of monetary policy from a call rate to reserve balance 
requirement in March 2001, and implemented the yield curve control policy in 
September 2016; thus, identifying the interest rate channel of the monetary 
policy explicitly since the 2000s is difficult.
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foreign factors significantly impact the formation of long-term interest 
rates in Korea.7
B. Exchange rate channel
The exchange rate channel may also be weaker in Korea than 
in Japan. First, external factors such as the business cycle of the 
world economy, global liquidity conditions, and uncertainty in the 
international financial market have a significant influence on exchange 
rates because Korea is a small open economy (Yoo 2011). Moreover, 
considering the structure of the foreign currency funds flowing into 
Korea, an expansionary monetary policy is likely to increase inward 
foreign portfolio investment. Korea has a high ratio of stock investments 
among foreign currency funds;8 thus, if implementing an expansionary 
monetary policy leads to an increase in stock prices, it may lower 
exchange rates, unlike the traditional theory (Kim & Yoo 2001; Lee and 
Yoo 2006).9 As shown in Figures 3 and 4, the relationship between the 
internal and external interest rate differential and exchange rate from 
2004 to 2019 show that the KRW/USD exchange rate had correlations 
of 0.31 and 0.25 with the short- and long-term interest rate differential, 
respectively. However, the JPY/USD exchange rate had correlations of 
−0.58 and −0.66 with the short- and long-term interest rate differential, 
respectively, indicating that lower interest rates were accompanied by 
won appreciation in Korea and yen depreciation in Japan.10 The size of 
7 Kim and Oh (2015) used the dynamic Nelson-Siegel model to estimate the 
yield curve factors for Korea and the US. They argued that the impact of the US 
yield curve level on the Korean yield curve level increased remarkably since the 
global financial crisis. Furthermore, Ha and So (2017) built a structural VAR 
model that reflected external and internal factors and documented that external 
factors had a crucial role in determining the long-term interest rates in a small 
open economy, such as the UK, Canada, Korea, and Australia. 
8 For foreign portfolio investment from 2004 to 2019, Korea had 21.4% loans, 
26.3% bonds, and 52.3% stocks, whereas Japan had 34.1% loans, 28.3% bonds, 
and 37.6% stocks, showing that Korea had a remarkably higher ratio of foreign 
stock investments than Japan. 
9 Despite this possibility, Kim (2014) found that the upward adjustment in 
policy interest rates in Korea significantly decreased the KRW/USD exchange 
rate in the short run. 
10 The internal and external interest rate differential in this study is obtained 
by subtracting foreign interest rates from domestic interest rates. Therefore, the 
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the correlation coefficients was also considerably higher in Japan than 
in Korea.
C. Asset price channel
Among the asset price channels, the stock market channel is likely 
to operate more strongly in Japan than in Korea given the difference in 
the role of stocks as a financing tool for firms. 
Korea has a relatively smaller stock market than Japan, and firms 
have a low dependency on the stock market for financing, which is 
why the stock market cannot be expected to operate smoothly as a 
monetary policy transmission channel. The ratio of stocks among firms’ 
direct financing from 2004 to 2019 is 23.3% in Japan but only 7.6% 
in Korea (Table 1). In Japan, stock prices increased significantly since 
the implementation of Abenomics compared to house prices, thereby 
contributing to improved financing conditions for firms and a boost in 
investments.
However, ruling out the possibility that the housing market channel 
positive (negative) correlation indicates that the exchange rate falls (rises) and 
thus the currency appreciates (depreciates) when the country’s interest rate is 
lower (higher) than that in other countries.
Note:  Short-term interest rate differential is the gap between Korea’s CD rate and 
the three-month US LIBOR rate. The long-term interest rate differential is 
the three-year government bond yield gap.
Source: Bank of Korea
Figure 3
Krw/Usd ExchanGE ratE and intErnal and ExtErnal intErEst ratE 
diffErEntial
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would operate in Korea is difficult. As shown in Table 2, Korea has a 
high ratio of real estate ownership; thus, the wealth effect of housing 
price fluctuations may exceed stock price fluctuations.
D. Bank lending channel
Finally, for the bank lending channel, Korea and Japan have different 
patterns, with Korea focused on bank lending to households and Japan 
Note:  Short-term interest rate differential is the gap between the three-month 
Tokyo interbank offered rate and the three-month US LIBOR rate. The long-
term interest rate differential is the three-year government bond yield gap.
Source: CEIC
Figure 4
Jpy/Usd ExchanGE ratE and intErnal and ExtErnal intErEst ratE 
diffErEntial
Table 1
comparison of thE KorEan and JapanEsE stocK marKEts
 (2004-2019 average)




The ratio of stocks in 
direct financing
Korea 1,899 1,190 trillion KRW  7.6%
Japan 2,861 470.3 trillion JPY 23.3%
Note: 1.  Korea: Companies listed on the Korea Exchange (KOSPI, KOSDAQ, 
KONEX) / Japan: Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) 2. The ratio of stocks in 
direct financing is calculated as (stock issue balance)/(corporate bond 
issue balance + stock issue balance )×100.
Source: Korea Exchange, Japan Exchange Group
312 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
focused on bank lending to businesses. As shown in Table 3, loans 
by deposit banks explain this difference: such banks have a relatively 
higher percentage of bank lending to households in Korea and a 
relatively higher percentage of lending to businesses in Japan.
In Korea, firms’ dependency on banks diminished significantly 
after the Asian financial crisis, and mounting bank loans due to the 
accommodative monetary policy became more likely to increase bank 
lending to households for real estate purchases than bank lending to 
businesses to increase employment and equipment investments. Since 
the implementation of Abenomics in Japan, bank lending to businesses 
expanded more rapidly than bank lending to households, thus 
supporting corporate activities (Figure 5).
III. Empirical analysis
A. Model and data
This study considers the following reduced-form VAR model to 
compare the effectiveness of monetary policies.
Table 2
assEt ownErship in KorEan and JapanEsE hoUsEholds
 (unit: %)
Real estate Stocks Cash and deposits
Korea 60.2 5.6 15.4
Japan 37.6 5.2 31.5
Note: The ratio of total household assets, 2008-2017 average.
Source: OECD
Table 3
thE ratio of dEposit BanK loans in KorEa and Japan
 (unit: %)
Korea Japan
Bank lending to businesses 53.6 65.7
Bank lending to households 44.8 27.7
Note:  1. The numbers are 2004–2019 average. 2. The numbers for Korea cover 
general banks. For Japan, they cover the banks with business licenses in 
Japan.
Source: Korean Financial Supervisory Service, Bank of Japan
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 Yt = B(L) Yt–1 + C(L) Xt + ut,
where Yt is an m × 1 endogenous variable vector, Xt is an n × 1 exogenous 
variable vector, ut is the m × 1 residual vector, and E(ut) = 0, E(utut’) = Σ. 
B(L) and C(L) refer to the matrix polynomial for lag operator L. Since 
the 2000s, the world economy has been rapidly globalizing, a force that 
cannot be ignored for Korea or Japan. Thus, the exogenous variable 
vector is reflected in the model to control the effect of external factors.
The basic model consists of eight endogenous variables: the policy 
interest rate, industrial production index, consumer price index, 
monetary base, 10-year government bond yield, exchange rate against 
USD, stock price, and bank lending. The policy interest rate, industrial 
production index, consumer price index, monetary base, 10-year 
government bond yield, and exchange rate against USD are variables 
frequently used to analyze the effect of monetary policies. Stock price 
and bank lending are variables added to examine the impact through 
the asset price and credit channels. Bank lending was classified into 
bank lending to households and bank lending to non-households to 
verify the possibility that the transmission through the credit channel 
may vary depending on the loan type.11 In the following extended model, 
11 The time series of Korea’s bank lending to business is short; thus, the 
channel through bank lending to business in both countries was not analyzed. 
Source: Bank of Japan
Figure 5
BanK lEndinG Growth in Japan
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house prices12 are added to examine the asset price channel closely.
This study includes three exogenous variables: global industrial 
production index, global consumer price index, and US federal funds 
rate. The first two variables reflect the real economy, and the third 
variable reflects the financial economy. This study considers the 
possibility that, although Korea and Japan are operating flexible 
exchange rate systems, the global financial cycle affects the monetary 
policies of both countries due to the worldwide financial integration. 
The US monetary policy is viewed as one of the main contributors to 
the global financial cycle.13 The global industrial production index and 
global consumer price index are constructed by averaging the industrial 
production indexes and consumer price indexes of both countries’ 19 
major trading partners using their nominal GDPs as relative weights.14 
Monetary policy shocks are identified using the sign restriction 
method in Uhlig (2005). First, the impulse response functions are 
derived such that, if the policy interest rates decrease, the prices and 
monetary base increase, thereby eliminating the price puzzle and 
liquidity puzzle that frequently appear in VAR analyses. Furthermore, 
by reflecting the expectations hypothesis of the term structure model 
that the long-term interest rates reflect the expectations of future 
short-term interest rates, the constraints are set to decrease long-term 
interest rates when the policy interest rates decline.15 The impulse 
However, given that corporate debt takes up a high percentage of non-household 
debt, the effect of bank lending to business can be indirectly determined by 
analyzing non-household debt. 
12 House price is analyzed only in Korea. The monthly house price index of 
Japan has a relatively short time series and is thus not suitable for analysis.
13 According to the traditional “trilemma view,” despite the free capital mobility, 
flexible exchange rates enable the independent operation of monetary policy. 
However, the recent “dilemma view” maintains that independent monetary policy 
is impossible if capital account is not controlled directly or indirectly (Rey, 2015).
14 The 18 countries are Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Columbia, the Czech 
Republic, the Euro area, Hungary, India, Israel, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, 
Russia, South Africa, Sweden, the UK, and the US, as well as Japan included for 
Korea and Korea included for Japan.
15 The fact that the interest rate channel in Korea operated relatively smoothly 
was also considered (Bank of Korea, 2017). Japan implemented the yield curve 
control policy to increase purchases of long-term treasury bonds and maintain 
the 10-year government bond yield at a certain level to influence long-term 
interest rates.
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response functions from immediately after a shock to 12 months must 
satisfy the sign restrictions, as in Sholl and Uhlig (2008) and Kim 
and Lim (2018). The present study extracts 5,000 impulse response 
functions that satisfy the sign restrictions and uses them as data to 
compare the effectiveness of the monetary policies.
Monthly data are used in the analysis. Raw data are used for the 
policy interest rate and 10-year government bond yield, whereas other 
data are measured as the logarithms multiplied by 100 to estimate 
the VAR model and derive the impulse response functions. Seasonally 
adjusted values are used for the industrial production index, monetary 
base, and bank lending. For the policy interest rate, the base rate 
announced by the Bank of Korea is used for Korea, and the “shadow 
policy rate” based on the method by Wu and Xia (2016) is used for 
Japan. Given that Japan used various unconventional monetary 
policies such as quantitative easing, negative interest rates, and yield 
curve control as its major policies during the sample period, the interest 
rates announced by the Bank of Japan are not sufficient to analyze the 
monetary policy stance.
Furthermore, similar to Sholl and Uhlig (2008) and Kim and Lim (2018), 
this study applies six lags in the endogenous variables and none in the 
exogenous variables.16 The period of analysis for both countries is from 
July 2004 to September 2019. Details of the data used are provided in 
the Appendix.
B. Analysis results
Figure 6 summarizes the impulse response functions of the key 
macroeconomic variables when a-25bp cut in policy interest rates 
shocks in the basic model.17 According to the identification criteria of 
16 For lag order selection, LR test, Akaike information criteria (AIC), and 
Schwarz information criteria (SC) suggest that using six, four, and one lag for 
Korea, respectively, is optimal. For Japan, LR test, AIC, and SC suggest seven, 
two, and one lag, respectively. This study adopts six lags considering that the 
previous studies such as Scholl and Uhlig (2008) and Kim and Lim (2017) used 
six lags and the analysis results of this study are robust to the variations of the 
lag order.
17 Given the difficulty of securing sufficient time series, the direct effect of 
Abenomics, implemented since 2013, is not analyzed in this study. However, 
considering that the shadow policy rate and the Bank of Japan’s asset growth 
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Policy Interest Rate Industrial Production Consumer Price Index Monetary Base
10YR Government 
Bond Yield
Exchange Rate Stock Price Bank Lending
A. Korea
Note: Grey areas are the 68% error bands
Figure 6
impUlsE rEsponsE fUnctions for monEtary policy shocKs:  
all BanK lEndinG
Policy Interest Rate Industrial Production Consumer Price Index Monetary Base
10YR Government 
Bond Yield
Exchange Rate Stock Price Bank Lending
B. Japan
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monetary policy shocks, the prices and the monetary base increase, and 
the long-term interest rates decrease when the central banks of both 
countries lower the policy interest rates.
The size of the response does not vary much in prices, but Japan 
shows a more long-term increase than Korea. For the monetary base, 
Japan offers a greater and more significant response than Korea, 
and the effect also lasts relatively longer. The impact on long-term 
interest rates is more significant in Korea than in Japan, with a more 
substantial response.18 
The exchange rate channel, asset price channel, and bank lending 
channel show a clear difference between the two countries. First, for 
the exchange rate channel, the JPY/USD exchange rate and KRW/USD 
exchange rate increase after a monetary policy shock; the response 
size is greater and more significant for JPY/USD and lasts for a long 
time. In Korea, the won depreciation lasts for a short time, and the 
effect of policy interest rates on exchange rates disappears in the mid- 
to long-term. For the asset price and bank lending channel, Japan 
shows a significant increase in stock prices and bank lending when 
the adjustment in policy interest rates is downward, whereas Korea 
decreases stock prices and bank lending, although the magnitude is not 
significant.
The effect of monetary policy on industrial production has high 
uncertainty in both countries. In Japan, industrial production increases 
partially after the Bank of Japan implements an accommodative 
monetary policy, but this response lasts for two months in the early 
period.19 In the remaining period, the response of industrial production 
rate show annual averages of −0.96% and 2.8% from 2004 to 2012 and −5.51% 
and 20.9% from 2013 to 2019, the estimation results of the monetary policy 
transmission effect in this study are likely to be because of the implementation 
of Abenomics to a considerable extent.
18 Being cautious about assuming that the interest rate channel is more 
effective in Korea than in Japan is necessary. As a result of the “yield curve 
control” policy to minimize fluctuations in the long-term interest rates, the 
fluctuations of long-term interest rates can be relatively insignificant. The 
interest rate channel of Japan’s monetary policy requires a counterfactual 
experiment as an additional analysis. 
19 This finding is partially consistent with previous results that, despite the 
smooth operation of the bank lending channel, the effect of boosting the real 
economy fell short of expectations. Bowman, Cai, Davies, and Kamin (2015) 
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to monetary policy is small and insignificant. In Korea, the results 
indicate no significant increase in industrial production after decreasing 
policy interest rates.
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the results after separating bank lending 
in the basic model into bank lending to households and bank lending 
to non-households. The figures show that the results in Japan are 
not much different from those obtained from the full bank lending 
sample even when considering the types of bank lending separately. 
An accommodative monetary policy shock increases prices and the 
monetary base and decreases long-term interest rates. Furthermore, the 
exchange rate, stock prices, and bank lending rise. The results for bank 
lending to households and bank lending to non-households do not 
differ much. 
However, in Korea, the results show a clear difference between 
bank lending to households and bank lending to non-households. The 
analysis using overall bank lending shows that the effect of a lower 
policy interest rate on bank lending and stock prices is insignificant, 
but the analysis using bank lending to households shows that a lower 
policy interest rate leads to a significant rise in bank lending and stock 
prices. Furthermore, industrial production shows a substantial increase 
with a time lag. This effect disappears when using bank lending to non-
households, showing contrary results; the lower policy interest rate 
leads to a fall in stock prices and bank lending. Furthermore, despite 
the cut in policy interest rates, industrial production does not show a 
significant response.
Considering that a large part of the bank lending to households in 
Korea is related to real estate, increased bank lending to households is 
expected because a downward adjustment in policy interest rates may 
result in soaring house prices. This study confirms this possibility using 
a nine-variable extended model applied to Korea by adding the house 
price variable to the basic model using bank lending to households. 
analyzed the effect of quantitative easing (QE1) in 2001–2006 on the bank 
lending channel in Japan empirically. They concluded that, while bank liquidity 
had a statistically significant positive effect on bank lending, the effect on the 
real economy was extremely small. Montgomery and Volz (2017) also discovered 
that, while quantitative easing was effective in increasing bank lending, most of 
the effect was through undercapitalized banks; thus, the economic boost was 
limited. 
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Policy Interest Rate Industrial Production Consumer Price Index Monetary Base
10YR Government 
Bond Yield
Exchange Rate Stock Price Bank Lending to 
Households
A. Korea
Policy Interest Rate Industrial Production Consumer Price Index Monetary Base
10YR Government 
Bond Yield
Exchange Rate Stock Price Bank Lending to 
Households
B. Japan
Note: Grey areas are the 68% error bands.
Figure 7
 impUlsE rEsponsE fUnctions for monEtary policy shocKs:  
BanK lEndinG to hoUsEholds
320 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Policy Interest Rate Industrial Production Consumer Price Index Monetary Base
10YR Government 
Bond Yield
Exchange Rate Stock Price Bank Lending to 
Households
A. Korea
Policy Interest Rate Industrial Production Consumer Price Index Monetary Base
10YR Government 
Bond Yield
Exchange Rate Stock Price Bank Lending to 
Households
B. Japan
Note: Grey areas are the 68% error bands.
Figure 8
impUlsE rEsponsE fUnctions for monEtary policy shocKs:  
BanK lEndinG to non-hoUsEholds
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Figure 9 shows the impulse response functions derived from the 
extended model. Similar to Figure 7, the extended model in Figure 9 
shows that, after the decrease in the policy interest rate, bank lending 
to households balloons significantly, and stock prices and industrial 
production increase. Furthermore, house prices rise considerably after 
the cut in policy interest rates, as expected.
In summary, Korea has relatively greater constraints than Japan in 
terms of the effectiveness of its monetary policy. The effect of monetary 
policy on decreasing long-term interest rates is large, but the effect on 
the exchange rate is short-term, and no effect is observed through the 
Note: Grey areas are the 68% error bands.
Figure 9
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asset price and bank lending channels. However, after splitting the bank 
lending channel, the lowering in policy interest rates leads to rising bank 
lending to households, thereby inducing increased stock prices and 
industrial production to a certain extent. However, this effect is possibly 
accompanied by a rise in house prices. Meanwhile, despite the difference 
in effectiveness, monetary policy may have limited success in boosting 
the real economy in Korea and Japan.
C. Robustness checks
This section reports on three additional analyses to check the 
robustness of the main results. Figure 10 shows how the impulse 
response functions change in the basic model when the lags of 
endogenous variables are increased to eight.20 The overall results 
do not alter much from the original model, which uses six lags. The 
exchange rate channel, stock price channel, and bank lending channel 
operate more smoothly in Japan than in Korea like when using six 
lags. However, the change in lags makes the difference in the impulse 
response functions for industrial production. Industrial production in 
Korea does not show a significant response when using six lags, but the 
results show a significant decline when using eight lags, even though it 
is just for a short time. Industrial production in Japan indicates only a 
slight variation in the impulse response according to lags.
Figure 11 shows the impulse response functions when using the 
industrial production and consumer price index of only the US, the Euro 
area, and China to create exogenous variables such as the global 
industrial production index and global consumer price index instead 
of the full set of 19 major trading partners. The results show little 
difference. In Japan, the shock of a lowering in policy interest rates 
leads to a mid- to long-term increase in the exchange rate, stock prices, 
and bank lending. However, in Korea, the depreciation of the Korean 
won is merely short-term and shows no rise in stock prices or bank 
lending. The impact of a shock of a cut in policy interest rates on 
industrial production shows high uncertainty in Japan and Korea, but 
the results are similar to those of the extended experiments using eight 
lags. Korea first shows a significant shrinkage in industrial production, 
20 Using nine or more lags widens the error band significantly because of the 
degrees of freedom problem.
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but this response remains during a brief period.
Finally, Figure 12 shows the resulting changes when adding a dummy 
variable for the implementation period of Abenomics as an exogenous 
variable in Japan. This change accounts for the possibility that the 
transmission channels of Japan’s monetary policy may have varied since 
the implementation of Abenomics.21 Even when adding this dummy 
variable, no qualitative difference is observed in terms of transmission 
channels or effects of monetary policy. However, in the quantitative 
aspect, the transmission channels and effects weaken after adding the 
dummy variable. In particular, stock prices temporarily fall from the 
shock until after 12 months, and the expansion in bank lending is no 
longer significant. Nonetheless, no difference is found in the conclusion 
that the monetary policy shocks in Japan have a greater and more 
apparent impact on major macroeconomic variables than those in Korea.
21 Botman et al. (2015) claimed that Abenomics could have these outcomes 
when differentiating the size or scope of the monetary policy compared to before. 
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Figure 12
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IV. Conclusion
This study comparatively analyzes the transmission channels 
and effects of monetary policies in Korea and Japan using the sign 
restriction VAR model to determine whether a Japanese-style monetary 
policy can be implemented in Korea. The results indicate significant 
differences in the monetary policy transmission channels between 
Korea and Japan. In Japan, conventional monetary policy transmission 
channels such as the exchange rate channel, asset price channel, 
and bank lending channel operate relatively well. However, these 
transmission channels do not function smoothly in Korea. The interest 
rate channel is effective in Korea but has only a short-term effect on 
exchange rates, and the asset price and bank lending channels are 
hard to expect.
Furthermore, some potential risks may hinder financial stability 
through the housing market. Such differences in the effectiveness of 
monetary policy are because of the different economic structures of 
the two countries, such as the impact of the global economy, financial 
market structure, and asset ownership of households. Meanwhile, 
Korea and Japan show a limited effect on production in the real side of 
the economy. Considering these results, Korea must be careful about 
implementing a similar monetary policy as Japan. As the low-growth, 
low-inflation environment is expected to become the new normal, and 
an increasing need for a monetary policy response is observed. However, 
Korea must devise measures while closely reviewing the internal and 
external economic environment, the financial market conditions, and 
the behaviors of economic agents. Furthermore, efforts to prevent the 
low-growth and low-inflation pressure from setting in through finding 
new growth engines and reforming the economy’s fundamentals are 
necessary.
(Received April 16 2021; Accepted April 23 2021)
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Appendix: Data Sources
Variables Sources and Notes
Policy interest rate Korea: Base rate announced by the Bank of Korea / 
Japan: Shadow policy rate estimated by the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand following Wu and Xia (2016) 
Monetary base Bank of Korea and Bank of Japan; seasonal adjustment 
using Census X-12 on E-views
10-year government 
bond yield
OECD Main Economic Indicators
Industrial production 
index
IMF International Financial Statistics. Seasonal 
adjustment index
Consumer price index IMF International Financial Statistics
The exchange rate 
against USD
IMF International Financial Statistics
Stock price index Bank of Korea. KOSPI in Korea; NIKKEI index in Japan
Bank lending Bank of Korea and Bank of Japan; amount lent by 
deposit banks
House price index Kookmin Bank; House Purchasing Price Index
